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We exploit the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) to examine the effect of an important 
managerial disciplining mechanism, the takeover market, on the quality of non-GAAP reporting. FINSA 
significantly reduced the likelihood of takeover for a large fraction of the CRSP-Compustat universe. We draw 
inferences using a difference-in-differences research design by contrasting non-GAAP disclosures by FINSA-
affected firms with those of unaffected firms, before and after FINSA. We find that FINSA-affected firms 
more often exclude recurring expenses, more often exclude expenses incremental to those excluded by analysts, 
and more often use non-GAAP earnings to convert a GAAP-based miss of an earnings forecast to a beat, after 
FINSA. This effect accentuates predictably with the extent to which FINSA-affected firms are susceptible to 
the takeover market in the pre-FINSA period, and with the extent to which non-GAAP earnings determine 
manager compensation. We conclude by documenting a decline in non-GAAP earnings persistence and the 
value-relevance of non-GAAP earnings after FINSA. Our evidence demonstrates the role of the takeover 
market in curbing opportunistic non-GAAP reporting.  
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the market for corporate control on the quality of 
non-GAAP disclosures. In the US, the practice of disclosing non-GAAP performance measures has grown in 
frequency since the late 1990s, with over 70% of S&P 500 firms reporting non-GAAP earnings in 2014 (Black 
et al., 2018b). Proponents of non-GAAP reporting argue that companies use non-GAAP measures to focus 
investor attention on “core earnings” that exclude non-recurring items and better predict future earnings (Pitt 
2001). This view is corroborated by the extent to which the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings exceeds 
GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Elliott, 2006; Ribeiro et al., 2018; Phelps, 2019).  
However, critics argue that non-GAAP measures are susceptible to managers’ opportunistic exclusion 
choices. For example, former SEC Enforcement Division Chief Accountant Howard Scheck characterizes non-
GAAP metrics as a “fraud risk factor” and a “source of (investor) confusion” (Leone, 2010), one that former 
SEC chair Mary Jo White argues is worthy of “close attention [from regulators]” (Teitelbaum 2015). Similarly, 
Lynn Turner, former chief accountant of the SEC, warned investors of the positive bias in non-GAAP earnings 
and characterized non-GAAP earnings as “EBBS: earnings before the bad stuff”.1 
To address these tensions around the role and merits of non-GAAP reporting, a large body of literature 
on non-GAAP reporting seeks to determine whether non-GAAP reporting is informative or opportunistic. 
The consensus in this literature is that non-GAAP reporting is informative to investors, on average. In a recent 
survey of the extant literature, Black et al. (2018c, p.286) note how non-GAAP reporting quality has improved 
over the years, and that managers use non-GAAP reporting primarily for “informative reasons.” Nonetheless, 
we know little about how non-GAAP reporting responds to exogenous variation in capital market 
characteristics. Two exceptions include Bhattacharya et al. (2018) and Christensen et al. (2018) who find that 
increases in short selling and analyst coverage temper opportunistic non-GAAP reporting.  
We add to this literature by examining the effect of the takeover market on non-GAAP reporting. Changes 
in the takeover market have large implications for management. Theoretical research indicates that an active 
                                                          
1 Further characterizing non-GAAP reporting as subject to management discretion is a Chief Audit Executive (CAE) at a mid-cap 
publicly held company who stated that “[t]he way a company treats a non-GAAP measure is indicative of the way management behaves” 
(personal communication with CAE, March 13, 2019).  
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takeover market disciplines managers (Jensen, 1993; Scharfstein, 1988; Manne, 1965; Williamson, 1983; 
Grossman and Hart, 1980; Macey, 1988; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1998). Empirical evidence indicates a positive 
(negative) association between the strength of the takeover market and CEO turnover (compensation) (Lel and 
Miller, 2015; Harford, 2003; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Frattaroli, 2019). This evidence supports a 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicting that managerial opportunism, absent the disciplining effects of 
an active takeover market, will lead to heightened myopic behavior due to compensation incentives (Healy and 
Whalen, 1999; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980). Relatedly, a weaker takeover market reduces incentives for 
private information gathering and thereby increases managers’ ability to engage in opportunistic non-GAAP 
reporting. Takeover premiums are large (Eckbo, 2009) and a reduction in the likelihood of takeover will temper 
the demand for private information in capital markets (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Tempered private information-
gathering activities may increase information asymmetry between management and outsiders and permit greater 
opportunism in non-GAAP reporting. Black et al. (2018a) report that non-GAAP earnings are frequently used 
as a performance metric in compensation contracts. Guest, Kothari and Pozen (2019) further find an 
association between income-increasing expense exclusions from non-GAAP earnings and higher executive 
compensation. Overall, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts a weakened takeover market will lead 
to more opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. 
Four countervailing effects suggest the opposite. First, evidence provided by Black et al. (2017b) suggests 
that accrual-based earnings management is a substitute for opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. Because the 
takeover market is also associated with increased earnings management (Godsell, 2019), managers may instead 
shift emphasis to accrual-based earnings management when orchestrating the appearance of improved 
performance in a weakened takeover market rather than opportunistic non-GAAP reporting.2 Second, 
managers concerned with maintaining the pre-FINSA level of disclosure quality may supplant foregone private 
information-gathering activities by improving the informativeness of non-GAAP reporting. Third, entrenched 
managers may respond to a reduced likelihood of CEO turnover by indulging in the quiet life (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010). Managers pursuing the quiet life may engage in fewer high-
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Badertscher (2011) and Zang (2012) for a review of trade-offs in earnings management methods. 
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effort activities such as opening new factories or closing poorly performing factories. The quiet life may have a 
mechanical effect on managers’ ability to engage in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting because the recurring 
exclusions most commonly characterized as opportunistic are investment and depreciation expenses (Black et 
al., 2018b). Fourth, managers better protected from the takeover market may have fewer career concerns that 
would otherwise motivate the orchestration of improved performance through opportunistic non-GAAP 
reporting. Overall, variation in the takeover market is likely to have countervailing effects on non-GAAP 
reporting and it is an empirical question whether, and to what extent, the takeover market determines non-
GAAP reporting outcomes.  
We parse between these competing predictions by exploiting a new source of exogenous variation in the 
threat of takeover for U.S. firms. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) significantly 
altered the threat of takeover for a large fraction of the Compustat Universe of U.S. firms deemed important 
to national security. FINSA provides a powerful setting in which to examine the effects of exogenous variation 
in the takeover market because FINSA added substantial costs to foreign takeovers of U.S. firms in a subset of 
industries by spurring an obscure and inactive regulatory committee, the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS), to scrutinise foreign investment proposals.  
Precipitating FINSA was the acquisition of a port management company operating six major U.S. seaports 
by a state owned company in the United Arab Emirates in February 2006. Spurred by perceived security threats 
regarding port security, Congressional representatives clamoured for legislative reform of the U.S. foreign 
investment vetting process. To defuse the situation, the UAE acquirer agreed to sell the newly acquired assets 
in March 2006 (New York Times, 2006). Nonetheless, Congress and Senate would eventually table over 60 
proposed pieces of legislation to address perceived security concerns stemming from foreign investment 
(Graham and Marchick, 2006). Congress and the Senate debated the legislation that would become FINSA 
during 2006 and 2007, with the Department of Treasury releasing the first draft of implementing regulations to 
CFIUS in April 2008.3  
                                                          
3 The final implementing regulations issued in December 2008 were virtually identical to the initially proposed regulations (Rose, 2014).  
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While ostensibly improving national security, FINSA increased the costs of foreign takeover in four ways. 
First, by increasing the likelihood of an extended CFIUS investigation of a proposed foreign takeover.4 Second, 
by increasing U.S. Congressional involvement in the regulatory approval process and, thereby, political 
uncertainty for foreign acquirers.5 Third, by increasing the number of national security-related concessions 
required from foreign acquirers before takeover approval.6 Fourth, by increasing the enforcement of, and 
penalties related to lapses in, foreign acquirer commitments to mitigate ongoing national security concerns.7  
An ideal feature of the FINSA setting is the availability of a counterfactual. FINSA provides not only an 
exogenous source of variation in the threat of takeover, but one that primarily affects firms in industries related 
to national security, while those outside this scope are left relatively untreated. Godsell, Lel and Miller (2019) 
show that equity values for national-security related firms ebbed and flowed as the strength and severity of 
FINSA legislation varied during the multi-year legislative process. They conclude that, ultimately, FINSA 
reduced firm value and takeover likelihood for firms in industries deemed related to national security by CFIUS, 
while finding little change in equity value and takeover likelihood of firms in industries unrelated to national 
security.8 Overall, Godsell et al. (2019) demonstrate that FINSA led to a strong and credibly exogenous decline 
in the threat of the takeover market for FINSA-affected firms, with little effect on other firms. 
                                                          
4 An investigation subsequent to the 30-day CFIUS review extends the CFIUS process by 45 days. Indicative of these significant changes 
to the Defense Production Act, the percentage of foreign investment notices investigated by the CFIUS skyrocketed starting in 2007, 
as shown in Figure 1. Lengthy approval periods are costly for foreign investors because they increase the probability of competing bids 
(Jarrell and Bradley, 1980).  
5 Bhagwat, Dam and Harford (2016) provide evidence that uncertainty decreases merger and acquisition activity—e.g., “Morgan Stanley 
said its sale of certain oil-trading and storage businesses to OAO Rosneft may fall apart, as tensions between the U.S. and Russian 
governments leave the deal in limbo…. Confidence that the sale will ever secure CFIUS's blessing has faded as the U.S. escalated its 
response to Russia's interference in Ukraine” (Dow Jones News Service, October 10, 2014). 
6 E.g., forcing the target to forfeit sales to the U.S. government or to comply with requests to open books and facilities to authorities 
without warrant (Byrne, 2015: 877).  
7 E.g., a penalty up to the value of the transaction for mitigation agreement breaches. 
8 At least two caveats are necessary. First, while CFIUS characterizes certain industries as relevant to national security, CFIUS has the 
purview and authority to examine M&A transactions affecting firms outside the list of industries they provide. This may occur, for 
example, if the foreign acquirer hails from a country deemed rival to the United States and if the target firm is located adjacent to an 
undisclosed military base (see, e.g., Ralls vs. CFIUS, 2015 [Li, 2017]), or, if the target firm possesses data that can be used to compromise 
government or military officials (e.g., the CFIUS forced a Chinese owner to sell Grindr in 2019 in the interests of national security [New 
York Times, 2019]).   
Relatedly, CFIUS is a political entity and politicians may view foreign investment as positive or negative for reasons unrelated 
to national security, either because of the nature of the foreign acquirer or because of the nature or location of the target firm. 
Consequently, CFIUS may scrutinize industries outside of industries listed in the 2008 Annual Report if co-opted by politicians. Our 
definition of treatment will suffer from measurement error if CFIUS scrutinizes industries other than those industries listed in the 2008 
CFIUS Annual Report. Such a confound works against our predicted findings because the population of treated firms in the control 
group will narrow the gap in observed differences between treatment and control before and after FINSA.  
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Emulating their research design, we examine firm outcomes for FINSA-affected firms after FINSA, 
relative to firms largely unaffected by FINSA, to examine the impact of the takeover market on the quality of 
non-GAAP reporting. We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis that examines non-GAAP reporting 
in FINSA-affected firms (treatment) and non-FINSA affected firms (control) before and after the enactment 
of FINSA. A DiD estimator showing that FINSA-affected firms more often exclude recurring expenses from 
non-GAAP earnings, relative to control firms, provides our first evidence on the effect of the takeover market 
on the quality of non-GAAP reporting. Second, we demonstrate that the magnitude of recurring exclusions 
increases after FINSA for FINSA-affected firms, relative to control firms. Third, we find that FINSA-affected 
firms more often exclude expenses from non-GAAP earnings that analysts do not. Fourth, we find that the gap 
by which manager exclusions exceed analysts exclusions grows for FINSA-affected firms after FINSA, relative 
to control firms. Fifth, we find that FINSA-affected firms more often use non-GAAP earnings to beat analyst 
benchmarks when GAAP earnings fall short. In subsequent analysis, we provide corroborating evidence of our 
channel (the takeover market) as well as a mechanism (executive compensation) by showing that these effects 
are predictably concentrated in: 1) firms which had a higher probability of takeover pre-FINSA; and 2) firms 
whose managers’ compensation is more sensitive to non-GAAP earnings. We further demonstrate that FINSA-
affected firms’ change in non-GAAP reporting behavior reduced the power of non-GAAP earnings to predict 
future financial performance. We conclude with evidence that investors recognize the shift in managers’ non-
GAAP reporting incentives, as evidenced by a decline in the value-relevance of FINSA-affected firms’ non-
GAAP earnings after FINSA, relative to control firms. 
Overall, our results show that financial protectionism has important financial reporting consequences. Our 
evidence supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis by showing that a weakened takeover market 
degrades the quality of non-GAAP reporting. These insights are relevant to non-GAAP scholars, investors, 
analysts, auditors, board directors and regulators interested in the determinants of non-GAAP reporting quality 
and to audiences interested in the unintended consequences of regulating foreign investment. Our findings 
should be of interest to legislators in the U.S. where CFIUS authority has been expanded, under the Foreign 
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Investment Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2018, to include foreign investment in start-ups,9 joint 
ventures and greenfield foreign investment (Rose, 2018). It should also be of interest to legislators in the 
increasing number of countries that are considering or have recently passed FINSA-like legislation where 
reporting of non-GAAP earnings is proliferating (e.g., Britain, France, Germany, China, and India [Steinitz and 
Ingrassia, 2009; CNN Business, 2018]). The rest of this paper is as follows. We describe the FINSA setting, the 
prior literature, and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe our sample and research 
design. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2.0 Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 A primer on the FINSA setting 
The origins of CFIUS are rooted in the Defense Production Act of 1950, which permits the U.S. President 
to reject foreign investments that threaten national security. To allow the administration to adapt to evolving 
forms of national security threats, national security is deliberately undefined in legislation and regulatory 
documents. Moran (2009), however, describes three potential national security threats posed by foreign 
acquirers. First, excessive reliance upon foreign-owned enterprises could render defense contractors vulnerable 
to supply chain disruptions. Second, acquired technology could be deployed by the acquirer for other than 
commercial and financial purposes, potentially enabling U.S. rivals. Third, the acquired entity could be used as 
a conduit or channel through which foreign entities could inhibit U.S. interests (e.g., through surveillance, 
infiltration and sabotage).  
President Ford delegated the review of foreign transactions to CFIUS in 1975. Before FINSA, the 
outcomes of CFIUS reviews were nearly always affirmative and injected few political uncertainties into the 
acquisition process for domestic targets and foreign acquirers (Byrne, 2006). In contrast, by enacting FINSA in 
2008 to amend the Defense Production Act, Congress significantly increased CFIUS’s ability to thwart foreign 
acquisitions. FINSA charges CFIUS with scrutinizing foreign investments for patterns of coordinated 
                                                          
9 While it is too early to empirically assess the effects of FIRRMA, the effect of CFIUS on foreign investment in start-ups is already 
anecdotally observable. For example, On April 5, 2019, CFIUS ordered iCarbon X, a Chinese company to divest its majority stake of 
U.S. start-up, PatientsLikeMe, due to national security concerns.   
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acquisition behavior that could result in the transfer of advanced technologies to U.S. rivals. Three times since 
2008, the CFIUS has concluded that 
…the United States Intelligence Community believes that there may be an effort among foreign 
governments or companies to acquire U.S. companies involved in research, development, or production of 
technologies for which the United States is a leading producer. (CFIUS, 2012; p. 23; 2014; p.26; 2015; p. 29) 
 
In strengthening CFIUS, FINSA increased the barriers to foreign investors in four main ways. First, FINSA 
delays the acquisition timeline by increasing the purview of CFIUS and, thus, the likelihood of not only a 
month-long “review” process but also a second 45-day CFIUS “investigation.” Lengthy approval periods are 
costly for would-be acquirers because they increase the probability of competing bids (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980).  
Second, FINSA increases deal uncertainty by injecting additional political risk for foreign acquirers. FINSA 
gives Congress a larger role in the investment approval process, adding to the uncertainty of the President’s 
approval. Prior research shows that uncertainty decreases investment activity (Bonaime, Gulen and Ion, 2018; 
Jens, 2017; Bhagwat, Dam and Harford, 2016). Uncertainty is further accentuated because all details of CFIUS 
investigations are kept confidential. CFIUS is exempt from FOIA, so there are no disclosures of even basic 
information, such as the name of the potential foreign acquirer or domestic target.  
Third, FINSA increases the likelihood that foreign investors are burdened with costly national security risk 
mitigation agreements. For example, mitigation agreements may require that the acquirer terminate specific 
activities of the U.S. business being acquired or provide the U.S. government with the right to review certain 
business decisions and object if they raise national security concerns. Appendix A provides a comprehensive 
list of economically burdensome risk mitigation clauses. Consistent with risk mitigation costs being large, 
foreign investors frequently abandon their proposed deal after CFIUS proposes risk mitigation terms. Other 
would-be foreign acquirers simply withdraw their offers after learning that the CFIUS would review the deal.10  
Fourth, FINSA strengthens CFIUS enforcement and penalties for noncompliance. FINSA provides for 
the “imposition of civil penalties for any violation…, including [violations of] any mitigation agreement” (p. 
97). FINSA also encourages CFIUS to “develop and agree upon methods for evaluating compliance with any 
                                                          
10 For example, “Tsinghua Unisplendour, a Chinese state-controlled company, dropped plans to buy 15% of Western Digital, an 
American maker of computer hard-drives, for $3.8 billion. The Chinese withdrew after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States, a government body, said it would review the deal.” The Economist (Espresso), February 24th, 2016.  
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agreement entered into or condition imposed with respect to a covered transaction that will allow the 
Committee to adequately assure compliance,” which bolsters their sanctioning authority (p. 97). Rose (2014) 
notes that “FINSA allows CFIUS to reopen reviews and investigations if there has been an intentional breach 
of a mitigation agreement” (p. 32). After FINSA, the breaking of a mitigation agreement can result in monetary 
penalties up to the full value of the transaction and may potentially force the unwinding of the transaction 
(Rose, 2014; p. 14).  
2.2 Non-GAAP Literature Review  
Investors pay more attention to non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings when allocating capital. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) were the first to compare the informativeness of GAAP earnings with non-GAAP 
earnings using a hand-collected non-GAAP disclosure sample. The authors found that investors and analysts 
reacted more to non-GAAP earnings news than to GAAP earnings news. Elliott (2006) finds that experiment 
participants base trading decisions primarily on non-GAAP earnings highlighted by the firm in its earnings 
announcement. Ribeiro et al. (2018) find that non-GAAP earnings are more value-relevant for Australian firms. 
Phelps (2019) finds that both non-GAAP earnings and funds flow from operations (a non-GAAP cash flow 
figure) are more informative to investors than GAAP earnings.  
Because investors rely on non-GAAP earnings when forming prices, managers can use discretion in non-
GAAP earnings to improve investor understanding of firm performance, but they may also opportunistically 
use discretion in non-GAAP earnings to orchestrate the appearance of higher performance. Much of the non-
GAAP literature parses between these competing determinants of non-GAAP reporting with increasing 
evidence that non-GAAP reporting is informative to investors, on average (Black et al., 2018c). For example, 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to 
disclose non-GAAP earnings. Curtis, McVay and Whipple (2014) examine firms that report net transitory gains 
(income-increasing special items) in some periods and net transitory losses in others. They find that the 
proportion of informative disclosers (firms that report non-GAAP earnings in both situations) is significantly 
higher than the proportion of opportunistic disclosers (those who report non-GAAP earnings only when there 
are net transitory losses). Other studies find improving non-GAAP reporting quality of over time. Kolev et al. 
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(2008) find that non-GAAP expense exclusions are more transitory (i.e., higher quality) after SEC intervention 
in non-GAAP reporting between 2001 and 2004. Zhang and Zheng (2011) find that stock mispricing for non-
GAAP reporters drops off after Regulation G. Black et al. (2017a) find that firms’ non-GAAP exclusions are 
less opportunistic in the post-SOX period. 
However, other studies document the appearance of opportunism in non-GAAP reporting. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2003) demonstrate that non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings 70% of the time, are positive 65.5% 
of the time (versus 52.0% for GAAP operating earnings from Compustat) and meet or beat analyst forecasts 
80% of the time (versus 39% of the time based on GAAP operating earnings). Doyle et al. (2003) find that the 
non-GAAP exclusions outside of special items have nearly all the predictive power of analyst-defined street 
earnings, but in the negative direction.11 This shows that managers’ exclude recurring expenses from non-
GAAP earnings despite Regulation G, which forbids firms from excluding charges and gains that have occurred 
within the previous two years or is likely to recur within two years. Barth et al. (2012) find that the predictive 
ability of non-GAAP earnings falls when firms exclude stock-based compensation expense post-SFAS 123R. 
Brown et al. (2012) find that managers’ non-GAAP exclusions have a greater negative relationship with future 
operating income prior to insider share sales, suggesting opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. 
Few papers examine the impact of distinct market forces on the quality of non-GAAP reporting.  
Christensen et al. (2014) find that short sellers appear to target opportunistic non-GAAP reporters and 
Bhattacharya et al. (2018) shows that the threat of short selling curbs firms’ opportunistic non-GAAP 
disclosures. Christensen et al. (2018) report that exogenous declines in analyst coverage cause managers to 
report non-GAAP earnings more opportunistically. Overall, this literature suggests that while non-GAAP 
reporting is informative on average, attenuation in managerial disciplining mechanisms and the information 
environment leads to increases in opportunistic behavior.  
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
                                                          
11 If the exclusions have negative predictive power for future earnings that means the exclusions include recurring (rather than non-
recurring) expenses. Assuming the purpose of non-GAAP reporting is to present “core earnings”, these recurring expenses should not 
be excluded as it causes investors to underestimate future expenses. 
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The discussion in Section 2.1 identifies FINSA as a source of exogenous variation in the costs borne by 
foreign acquirers of treatment firms. A nascent literature detects associations between these costs and the 
frequency and magnitude of foreign takeover activity (Godsell, Lel and Miller, 2019). Based on evidence of a 
significant decline in the takeover market following FINSA for FINSA-affected firms, we contribute to the 
literature described in Section 2.2 by investigating a new determinant of non-GAAP reporting.  
We present a null hypothesis acknowledging the myriad channels by which the takeover market may effect 
non-GAAP reporting. Management entrenchment theory predicts that myopia will increase after a negative 
shock to the takeover market because the takeover market is a managerial monitoring mechanism (Manne, 
1965). An attenuated takeover market grants managers leeway to extract rents from the firm because the 
takeover market is a managerial disciplining mechanism that spurs private information gathering activities that 
would otherwise curb managerial opportunism (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Absent an active takeover market, 
managers may more often engage in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting because non-GAAP earnings are a 
determinant of executive compensation (Black et al., 2018a; Guest, et al., 2019).  
In contrast, increasing use of accrual-based earnings management after FINSA by FINSA-affected firms 
(Godsell, 2019) may supplant non-GAAP earnings as a tool managers use to orchestrate the appearance of 
improved operating performance and reduce opportunism in non-GAAP reporting (Black et al., 2017b). 
Alternately, quiet life theory (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010) predicts that a 
weakened takeover market will increase the informativeness of non-GAAP reporting through the negative 
effect of reduced investment activity on the supply of the investment and amortization accruals typical of those 
recurring expenses that managers opportunistically exclude from non-GAAP earnings. Furthermore, managers 
with fewer career concerns and pressures to orchestrate the appearance of improved operating performance 
could also drive a reduction in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. Yet further, signalling theory suggests that 
managers may increase the informativeness of non-GAAP reporting to substitute for the reduction in private 
information gathering following the reduction in the takeover market activity. This theory predicts that market 
participants are cognizant of the managerial disciplining role played by the takeover market and will take steps 
to protect themselves if the takeover market is weakened. Managers keen to pre-empt this investor response 
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will improve the informativeness of non-GAAP reporting. Overall, we expect variation in the takeover market 
to either increase or decrease opportunistic non-GAAP earnings reporting. Formally stated:  
H0:  Non-GAAP reporting quality does not change after FINSA for FINSA-affected firms, relative 
to control firms. 
3.0 Data and Research Design  
3.1. Data 
Treatment firms are firms in the CFIUS list of industries deemed relevant to national security. Firms that 
fall within the definition of our treatment group provide “products and services to an agency or agencies of the 
U.S. government, or state or local authorities that have functions that are relevant to national security” (CFIUS 
Annual Report, 2015, p. 23).12 Appendix B provides a listing of qualitative attributes characterizing U.S. firms 
scrutinized by CFIUS. We form our DiD estimator by interacting our treatment variable, Treatment Industry, with 
our post variable, PostFINSA, which is an indicator variable equal to one in the twelve quarters after the second 
quarter of 2008, and zero in twelve quarters prior to March 2006: the month of the acquisition event that 
precipitated FINSA. We exclude the legislative period spanning March 2006 to June 2008 due to the legislative 
process’ conflicting market signals prior to the eventual adoption of CFIUS (Graham and Marchick, 2006; 
Godsell et al., 2019).  
Our tests use quarterly data. We draw firm-level financial statement data for our sample period from 
Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly File. Table 1 shows firm-year observations at each stage of the data 
screening process, starting with data retrieval and ending with the estimation sample. We start with 15,767 firm-
quarter observations in the intersection of Compustat, CRSP and I/B/E/S that report non-GAAP EPS 
(Bentley et al., 2018). We next remove firms with missing test and control variables, firms without data in both 
                                                          
12 Treatment industries are defined using industries listed in the 2008 CFIUS Annual Report to Congress (Public Version), which 
approximates the “Militarily Critical Technologies List” curated by the U.S. Department of Defense. Listed industries fall under the 
categories Advanced Materials and Processing, Chemicals, Advanced Manufacturing, Information Technology, Telecommunications, 
Microelectronics, Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment, Electronics: Military Related, Biotechnology, Professional/Scientific 
Instruments, Aerospace and Surface Transportation, Energy, Space Systems, and Marine Systems.  
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the pre- and post-FINSA period and firms in regulated industries.13 The estimation panel we use to test H0 
includes 6,100 (658) firm-quarters (distinct firms).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The DiD tests are formed using FINSA and non-FINSA affected firms. Approximately half (2,877) of 
estimate sample observations are FINSA-affected. Consistent with Godsell (2019) and Godsell, Miller and Lel 
(2019), Panel A of Table 2 shows that approximately two-thirds of treatment firms are in high-tech industries. 
We offer a year-quarter breakdown in in Panel B of Table 2. We observe a larger number of observations in 
the post period, consistent with the trend of increased use of non-GAAP reporting over time. To ensure that 
we are examining the same group of firms in the pre and post period, sample firms included in the post period 
are required to issue non-GAAP disclosures in at least one firm-quarter observation in the pre-period. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
We report summary statistics for variables included in the foregoing equations in Table 3. We find that our 
sample firms are profitable, with average (non-) GAAP EPS of ($0.41) $0.20 for control firms, and ($0.29) 
$0.12 for treated firms. These figures are in line with prior research, with Black et al. (2017a) reporting average 
(non-) GAAP EPS of ($0.35) $0.23 in their post-SOX sample. Firms in our sample (1) are large, with average 
total assets of $5.9B ($4.4B) for control (treated) firms; (2) are efficient, with average ROA of 0.08 (0.06) for 
control (treated) firms; and (3) priced favorably by investors, with average Market-to-Book of 2.56 (2.88) for 
control (treated) firms. Most firms in the sample are audited by a Big-4 audit firm (94% of control firms, 93% 
of treated firms) and have somewhat variable operating cash flows (3.7% of assets for control firms, 4.8% for 
treated firms). Investor sentiment was negative over the sample period, on average (-0.29 for control and treated 
firms). Compared to treated firms, control firms have somewhat less analyst following (9.9 analysts vs. 11.3), 
are more highly levered (debt-to-asset ratio of 0.55 vs. 0.40), and share the same proportion of institutional 
ownership (76%). Overall, control firms are repeat non-GAAP reporters less often than treated firms (57% vs. 
                                                          
13 There is notable variation in the definition of regulated industries in the non-GAAP literature. We test the sensitivity of our results 
to this research design choice in Section 5.  
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69%), with similar rates of special charges (63% vs. 65%). A difference-in-means test across treatment and 
control firms motivates our inclusion of our control variables in the model we estimate.  
Sample firms are very likely to exclude expenses from non-GAAP earnings, with 77% (87%) of control 
(treated) firms reporting higher non-GAAP EPS than GAAP EPS. Control (treated) firms exclude recurring 
expenses 61% (81%) of the time, and non-recurring expenses 59% (56%) of the time. These rates of exclusions 
are similar but somewhat higher than those reported in the Bhattacharya et al. (2018) estimation sample used 
that ends in 2007. In the mean, as a percent of total assets per share, control (treated) firms’ total excluded 
items amount to 1% (1.5%), while recurring items amount to <0.5% (>0.5%) and non-recurring items >0.5% 
(>0.5%). Both control and treated firms exclude expenses incremental to those excluded by analysts at a rate 
of 11% of the time, with these exclusions amounting to about 0.1% of total assets per share, on average. In 
terms of besting analyst estimates, control (treated) firms’ non-GAAP EPS meets or beats the consensus 
forecast, while GAAP EPS falls short, 40% (55%) of the time. This frequency is slightly higher than that 
reported in Christensen et al. (2018) who again use a different sample period.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3.2. Research Design 
To determine the effect of the takeover market on deterring opportunistic non-GAAP earnings, we 
estimate the general model described by Equation (1):  
Non-GAAP Reporting Outcomeit = B0 + B1Treatment Firmit + B2PostFINSAit + B3Treatment Industryit × PostFINSAit 
+ B4-15Controlsit + λk + τt + εit  (1) 
 
where Non-GAAP Reporting Outcome is defined by one of several alternative non-GAAP reporting variables, λk 
is a set of industry fixed effects and τt is a set of year-quarter fixed effects. Our outcome variables include 
Manager Total Exclusions Indicator, Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator, Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions Indicator, 
Manager Total Exclusions, Manager Recurring Exclusions, Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions, Manager Incremental 
Exclusions Indicator, Manager Incremental Exclusions and StreetBeat. We define all variables in Appendix C. We 
employ a probit model when the dependent variable is equal to either zero or one, and an OLS model when 
the dependent variable is continuous. We cluster standard errors by firm in all models. If the takeover market 
14 
 
deters opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, we expect to find a positive coefficient on B3 because FINSA 
weakens the takeover market (Godsell et al., 2019).  
We also include a battery of control variables prior research has found to influence firms’ non-GAAP 
reporting (Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Brown et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2018; Christensen et al., 2018). We 
control for firm size (Size), profitability (ROA), valuation (Market-to-Book), audit quality (Big 4 Indicator), cash 
flow volatility (Standard Deviation of Cash Flows), investor sentiment (Investor Sentiment), institutional ownership 
(Institutional Ownership), analyst coverage (Number of Analysts Following), leverage (Book Leverage), non-GAAP 
reporting history (Repeat non-GAAP Reporter), the expensing of special items (Special Charges), and a fourth-
quarter indicator (Fourth Quarter Indicator). Heflin and Hsu’s (2008) results inform our prediction for a negative 
coefficient on Size and a positive coefficient on Fourth Quarter Indicator. Based on Christensen et al. (2018), we 
predict negative coefficients on ROA, Standard Deviation of Cash Flows and Book Leverage, and positive coefficients 
on Number of Analysts Following and Institutional Ownership. The results of Bhattacharya et al. (2018) lead us to 
predict a negative coefficient on Market-to-Book and positive coefficients on Special Charges and Repeat non-GAAP 
Reporter. Brown et al.’s (2012) study motivates a negative prediction on the coefficient for Big 4 Indicator and a 
positive coefficient on Investor Sentiment.  
4.0. Results 
4.1 DiD Results 
4.1.1 The effect of the takeover market on non-GAAP Earnings 
To determine whether the takeover market deters opportunistic non-GAAP earnings we first examine the 
frequency of recurring and non-recurring non-GAAP exclusions after FINSA for FINSA-affected firms relative 
to control firms. We start by testing the overall relationship between a weakened takeover market and non-
GAAP exclusions in Table 4. The test variable and DiD estimator is Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA. In Column 
(1) we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on our DiD estimator which documents an 
increasing frequency of non-GAAP income-increasing expense exclusions in non-GAAP earnings after FINSA. 
This coefficient suggests a 5.2% marginal increase in the probability of treated firms excluding expenses from 
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non-GAAP earnings after FINSA.14 To distinguish between informative and opportunistic non-GAAP expense 
exclusions, we decompose non-GAAP exclusions into recurring and non-recurring exclusions. If a weakened 
takeover market causes an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP exclusions, then we will observe a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA in Column (2) where we replace our 
outcome variable with Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator. It is also possible that a correlated omitted variable 
somehow concurrently affects both recurring and non-recurring non-GAAP exclusions reported by FINSA-
affected firms, after FINSA. If this is the case, we will observe a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA in Column (3) where we replace our outcome variable with Manager Non-
Recurring Exclusions Indicator.   
In Column (2), we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on our DiD estimator, Treatment 
Industry × Post-FINSA. This variable suggests that our measure of opportunistic exclusions, recurring 
exclusions, increased after FINSA for FINSA-affected firms relative to control firms. The marginal effect of 
the DiD estimator is an economically significant 14.6% increase in the probability of recurring expense 
exclusion, relative to the probability of recurring expense exclusion across all firms.15 This is our first empirical 
evidence rejecting our null hypothesis, H0. In Column (3), we find a negative coefficient indistinguishable from 
zero on the DiD estimator. This result suggests that FINSA-affected firms did not change the frequency of 
non-recurring exclusions after FINSA relative to control firms.  
Control variable coefficients tabulated in Column (1) corroborate the prior literature. As predicted by 
Heflin and Hsu (2008), we find a negative coefficient on Size and Fourth Quarter. As predicted by Christensen 
et al. (2018), we find negative coefficients on ROA, Standard Deviation of Cash Flows, and Book Leverage, and 
positive coefficients on Number of Analysts Following. As predicted by Bhattacharya et al. (2018), we find a positive 
coefficient on Special Charges and Repeat Non-GAAP Reporter. Our ability to replicate these findings adds support 
to the robustness of results reported in the prior literature. The results in Table 4 provide our first contribution 
                                                          
14 The coefficient on Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA from Column (1) of Table 3 represents a 4.3% marginal increase in probability 
of expense exclusion from non-GAAP earnings. This is a 5.2% increase in probability relative to the rate of expense exclusion of all 
firms (82.2%). 
15 The marginal effect of a 10.3% increase in probability represents a 14.6% relative increase (sample mean = 70.3%).  
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to this literature by demonstrating that a weakened takeover market is associated with an increase in 
opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
To corroborate our initial empirical evidence, we next examine the effect of the attenuation in the takeover 
market caused by FINSA on the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions. In Table 5, as in Table 4, we first examine 
all exclusions and then exclusions decomposed into recurring and non-recurring exclusions. Similar to Table 4, 
we observe a positively but statistically marginal coefficient on our DiD estimator, Treatment Industry × Post-
FINSA, in Column (1). Our Table 4 evidence is corroborated by the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on the DiD estimator in Column (2) of Table 5. This coefficient translates into an economically 
meaningful 41.1% increase in the magnitude of recurring expenses excluded from non-GAAP earnings.16 In 
Column (3) of Table 5, we continue to find a DiD estimator indistinguishable from zero in tests examining the 
effect of the takeover market on non-recurring exclusions.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
It remains possible that exclusions anticipated to be non-recurring recur despite bona fide estimates by 
management. To examine whether the increase in recurring exclusions we observe in FINSA-affected firms 
after FINSA are errors rather than opportunistic, we juxtapose the exclusions reported by management with 
the exclusions recorded by IBES analysts. We posit that the recurring exclusions we observe may be errors that 
are best estimates based on the information available at the time if both managers and analysts record similar 
exclusions. The intuition is that recurring exclusions that are not similarly recorded by analysts are opportunistic. 
We estimate Equation (1) after replacing the outcome variable with an indicator equal to one if there is a gap 
between managers’ and analysts’ estimates of exclusions in Table 6. We find a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on our DiD estimator, Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA. The marginal effect is substantial, suggesting 
that after FINSA, FINSA-affected firms are 46.8% more likely to exclude more expenses from non-GAAP 
                                                          
16 The marginal effect of an increase in recurring exclusions of 0.2% of total assets represents a 41.1% increase in recurring exclusions 
relative to the sample mean of 0.5%. 
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earnings than analysts are willing to incorporate into their estimates.17 This is additional evidence of a negative 
association between the takeover market and the opportunism in non-GAAP reporting.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
We search for corroboration of this inference by regressing the magnitude of the wedge between managers 
and analysts estimates of exclusions in Table 7. We regress the outcome variable, Managerial Incremental 
Exclusions, on our DiD estimator, Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA. We report the results in Table 7. The DiD 
estimator, Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA, is positive and statistically significant, suggesting a 86.9% increase 
in the magnitude of expenses excluded by managers in excess of those excluded by analysts.18 This test further 
corroborates the negative association between the takeover market and opportunism in non-GAAP reporting.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
4.1.2 The effect of the takeover market on Miss-to-Beat conversion 
We conclude our main empirical analysis with tests investigating the extent to which managers use 
exclusions to orchestrate the appearance of analyst earnings forecast achievement. We regress the outcome 
variable, StreetBeat, on our DiD estimator, Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA. StreetBeat is an indicator variable 
equal to one if GAAP earnings miss an analyst earnings forecast while non-GAAP earnings meet or beat the 
analyst earnings forecast, and zero if 1) the inverse, 2) if neither beat, or 3) if both meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecast. We report the results in Table 8. The DiD estimator coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with FINSA-affected firms more often using non-GAAP exclusions to convert a miss to a beat after 
FINSA, relative to control firms. This coefficient represents a 49.0% marginal effect on the probability of 
turning a miss based on GAAP earnings into a meet or beat based on non-GAAP earnings.19 This evidence 
further corroborates earlier evidence of increased opportunistic non-GAAP exclusions after a decline in the 
strength of the takeover market.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
                                                          
17 The marginal effect of a 5.3% increase in probability represents a 46.8% relative increase (sample mean = 11.3%). 
18 The marginal effect of an increase in incremental exclusions of 0.07% of total assets represents an 86.9% increase in recurring 
exclusions relative to the sample mean of 0.08%. 




4.2 Cross Sectional Results 
4.2.1 Intensity of takeover threat 
The results of this study suggest that a decline in the potency of the takeover market causes managers to 
engage in more opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. If it is the weakening of this managerial disciplining 
mechanism that is causing managers to alter their voluntary disclosure strategies, we should observe a relative 
concentration of this effect in firms with a higher exposure, before the post-FINSA period, to takeover risk. 
This lends itself to a cross-sectional analysis examining firms with differing levels of pre-FINSA takeover 
likelihood. We estimate pre-FINSA takeover likelihood using the linear probability model in Equation (2):  
Takeoveriy = B0 + B1Sizeiy + B2Leverageiy + B3Market-to-Bookiy + B4PropRatioiy + B5Liquidityiy + B6Growthiy + 
B7Performanceiy + B8RETiy + B9HHIiy + λk + αy + εiy  (2) 
 
where Takeoveriy is equal to one if an acquirer purchases more than 50% of firm equity during the year at a cost 
in excess of $5 million. Karpoff et al. (2017) and Godsell et al. (2019) motivate our choice of firm-level control 
variables for Equation (2). Control variables including size, book leverage, market-to-book ratio, property ratio, 
liquidity ratio, sales growth, return on assets, market returns and HHI are defined in Appendix C. λk is a set of 
industry fixed effects, αy is a set of year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors by firm. 
After estimating this regression for fiscal years 2005-2008, we average the firm-year predicted values by 
firm to obtain the firm-specific predicted probabilities of takeover, then calculate their median value across the 
sample.20 Firms with predicted probabilities greater than the median face a higher exposure to takeover risk 
than firms with predicted probabilities below the median. We use this partition to estimate Equation (1) in the 
cross section, investigating how the impact of FINSA on non-GAAP reporting varies with the intensity of 
firm-specific takeover risk. We report the outcome in Panel A of Table 9. We find results consistent with a 
concentrated effect on firms with greater exposure to takeovers. This evidence corroborates FINSA’s effect on 
                                                          
20 The choice of years to include in the takeover prediction model requires a trade-off between sample size and sample relevance. 
Keeping the estimation period as close as possible to the post-FINSA period, where we observe non-GAAP reporting outcomes, is 
critical as takeover activity in this period is more closely associated with post-FINSA expected takeover probabilities than is takeover 
activity in previous periods. Including other years from our period of study (2004 or 2003-04) in the takeover prediction model yields 
qualitatively similar cross-sectional results and unchanged inferences. 
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the takeover market as the channel for the effect we observe because the effect is strongest for those firms 
most likely to be subject to the disciplining forces of the takeover market. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
4.2.2 The role of executive compensation 
Prior research demonstrates that non-GAAP earnings are frequently used as a performance metric in 
executive compensation contracts.21 We expect managers for whom non-GAAP earnings is a stronger 
determinant of compensation to engage in more opportunistic non-GAAP reporting after FINSA weakens the 
takeover market. To test our prediction, we first calculate the sensitivity of CEO compensation to non-GAAP 
earnings by estimating Equation (3) by industry:  
Compensationiy = B0 + B1NGEiy + B2GAAPIBiy + B3GAAPOIiy + B4Returnsiy + B5REViy + B6BTMiy + B7Tenureiy 
+ αy + εiy  (3) 
 
where Compensationiy is equal to the natural log of total compensation and NGEiy is equal to the natural log of 
annualized non-GAAP earnings. All variables are defined in Appendix C. αy is a set of year fixed effects and 
standard errors are clustered by firm. The choice of firm characteristics controlled for in the compensation 
model is motivated by previous literature (Guest et al., 2019).22 
After estimating this regression by industry for fiscal years 2005-2008, we calculate the median value of B1̂ 
across the sample.23 Industries with B1 estimates greater than (below) the median consist of firms with a higher 
(lower) sensitivity of executive compensation to non-GAAP earnings. We use this partition to estimate 
Equation (1) in the cross section, investigating how the impact of FINSA on non-GAAP reporting varies with 
the sensitivity of executive compensation to non-GAAP earnings. We report the outcome in Panel B of Table 
9. We find results consistent with a concentrated effect on firms with managers for whom non-GAAP earnings 
                                                          
21 Black et al. (2018a) and Guest et al. (2019) also report that the non-GAAP earnings figure reported to investors in earnings 
announcements is the same as the figure reported as a compensation determinant in proxy statements in most cases, with any differences 
being “generally small” (Guest et al., 2019). 
22 We also follow Guest et al. (2019) by setting NGEiy to zero if annualized non-GAAP earnings is negative. 
23 We require at least 20 observations per industry-level regression. This restriction is in place to ensure consistent estimates of B1. 
Results are qualitatively similar, and inferences are unchanged without this restriction or with other restriction levels, e.g., a minimum 
of 15, 25, or 30 observations. 
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is a stronger determinant of compensation. This is consistent with managers capitalizing on the decline in the 
takeover market by opportunistically reporting non-GAAP earnings in order to increase their compensation.  
4.3 Persistence Tests 
The results from section 4.1 suggest that managers of FINSA-affected firms are more likely to exclude 
recurring expenses from non-GAAP earnings and expenses incremental to those excluded by analysts, post-
FINSA. We have also shown that the magnitude of these exclusions has increased for FINSA-affected firms 
and that managers of these firms are more likely to use non-GAAP earnings to beat analysts’ expectations. We 
next test whether these changes in non-GAAP reporting behavior have resulted in lower-quality non-GAAP 
earnings as measured by earnings persistence. Inspired by Bentley et al. (2018), we test the persistence of non-
GAAP earnings by estimating Equation (4):  
Future Performanceit = B0 + B1Non-GAAP Earningsit + B2Non-GAAP Earningsit × PostFINSAit + B3Manager Total 
Exclusionsit + B4Manager Total Exclusionsit × PostFINSAit + B5PostFINSAit + B6-16Controlsit + λk + αt + εit  (4) 
 
where Future Performanceit is the sum of GAAP operating income over fiscal quarters t+1 to t+4. Non-GAAP 
Earningsit is non-GAAP EPS multiplied by diluted shares outstanding, divided by total assets at the end of 
quarter t. We control for Size, Market-to-Book, Big 4 Indicator, Standard Deviation of Cash Flows, Investor Sentiment, 
Institutional Ownership, Number of Analysts Following, Book Leverage, Repeat non-GAAP Reporter, Special Charges, and 
Fourth Quarter Indicator. λk is a set of industry fixed effects, αt is a set of year-quarter fixed effects and standard 
errors are clustered by firm. Equation (4) is estimated separately for control firms and FINSA-affected firms. 
If FINSA-affected firms’ non-GAAP reporting is more opportunistic, after FINSA, we should expect B2̂ < 0 
for FINSA firms. 
We report the coefficient estimates of interest from Equation (4) in Table 10. For both control firms and 
FINSA-affected firms, we see that B1̂ is significantly positive, suggesting strong persistence of non-GAAP 
earnings overall. We find a negative coefficient on B2̂ for FINSA-affected firms and a positive coefficient for 
control firms. This suggests that the quality of non-GAAP earnings declined for FINSA firms at the same time 
that it improved for control firms.24 Overall, we conclude that the changes in non-GAAP reporting behavior 
                                                          
24 The improvement in non-GAAP earnings quality for control firms is consistent with the consensus in the literature that the 
informativeness and quality of non-GAAP reporting has improved over time. The decline in non-GAAP earnings quality for treated 
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of firms facing a weakened takeover market have resulted in lower quality non-GAAP earnings less predictive 
of future performance.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
4.4 Value Relevance of Non-GAAP Earnings 
The increase in the magnitude and frequency of expenses excluded from non-GAAP earnings and the 
reduced persistence of non-GAAP earnings reported by FINSA-affected firms after FINSA suggest that 
FINSA-affected firms report non-GAAP earnings more opportunistically after FINSA. A salient question is 
whether investors in FINSA-affected firms recognize that managers’ incentives around non-GAAP reporting 
change after FINSA. We estimate the Ohlson (1995) value relevance model employed by Ribeiro et al. (2018) 
and Collins et al. (1997) to determine whether investor reliance on non-GAAP earnings changes after FINSA:  
Priceit = B0 + B1Earningsit × Treatment Industryit × PostFINSAit + B2Treatment Industryit + B3Earningsit + 
B4PostFINSAit + B5Treatment Industryit × PostFINSAit + B6Earningsit × Treatment Industryit + B7Earningsit × 
PostFINSAit + B8BVEit + B9Lossit + B10Earningsit × Lossit + εit  (5) 
 
where Earningsit is quarter t adjusted non-GAAP earnings in Column (1) and quarter t GAAP earnings in 
Column (2). All variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The results, reported 
in Column (1) of Table 11, suggest that investors indeed recognize the change in managers’ non-GAAP 
reporting incentives after the decline in the takeover market. The negative coefficient in Column (1) suggests a 
significant decline in the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings for FINSA-affected firms. We find that B1̂ is 
significantly negative for non-GAAP earnings, consistent with investors reducing their reliance on non-GAAP 
earnings when forming prices after FINSA. We re-estimate Equation (5) using GAAP EPS to determine 
whether a degradation of the information environment for FINSA-affected firms around FINSA could instead 
explain this result. We report the result in Column (2) of Table 11. The null result for B1̂ in Column (2) is 
inconsistent with this alternative explanation for the result in Column (1). Overall, Table 11 suggests investor 
awareness of the reduced quality of non-GAAP earnings.  
Insert Table 11 about here 
                                                          
firms is consistent with our finding of an increased magnitude in recurring expense exclusions post-FINSA, rendering the non-GAAP 




5.0 Additional Tests for Robustness 
The results of sections 4.1 through 4.4 are consistent with managers who are facing a decline in takeover 
risk engaging in myopic non-GAAP reporting. The tests in these sections produce significant results after 
factoring for other determinants of non-GAAP reporting documented in the literature. Nonetheless, we 
perform seven additional robustness checks to investigate the stability of our results. 
First, FINSA legislation affects U.S. firms. Potential threats to our inferences are contemporaneous events 
that affect all firms in critical industries regardless of country. To rule out the presence of a global factor that 
affects non-GAAP reporting by all firms in critical industries around FINSA, we replicate our test examining 
whether non-U.S. critical industry firms exclude more recurring expenses from non-GAAP earnings using 
European Union (EU) data.25 We present the results in Table 12. For this test, we juxtapose Column (1) of 
Table 12, which examines EU firms only, with Column (2) of Table 4, which examines U.S. firms only. The 
test variable in Table 12 is Placebo Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA. Placebo Treatment Industry is equal to one for 
firms in industries affected by FINSA, and zero otherwise. Of the 1,362 firm-years in the EU sample, 
approximately one-fifth are in FINSA-affected industries. If a global factor drives the variation in non-GAAP 
reporting that we observe in U.S. critical industry firms, then we expect to find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on our test variable in the EU sample that mirrors the positive and statistically significant 
test variable coefficient in Column (2) of Table 4. Instead, we find a negative and statistically insignificant 
coefficient on our test variable. The sign and significance of the test variable coefficient remains unchanged as 
we first add industry and year fixed effects in Column (2) of Table 12, and then as we add firm and year fixed 
effects in Column (3) of Table 12. These results do not support the competing explanation that there was a 
global shift in non-GAAP reporting by critical industry firms around the enactment of FINSA.  
Insert Table 12 about here 
 
                                                          
25 We follow the method used by Isidro and Marques (2019) to distinguish recurring from non-recurring exclusions in the EU setting. 
We thank Ana Marques and Helena Isidro for generously sharing their hand-collected EU non-GAAP reporting data. 
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Second, recognizing that values of some control variables are unevenly distributed across control and 
FINSA-affected firms, we conduct entropy balancing to better match treated firms with comparable control 
firms based on size, performance, and leverage. Using this entropy balanced sample, we re-run all our tests.26 
Results from the entropy balancing tests (untabulated) yield the same inferences as our main sample.  
Third, we control for year-quarter fixed effects in our tabulated tests. As FINSA had a simultaneous effect 
on firms covered by its legislation, the post-FINSA effect is subsumed by time fixed effects. We re-estimate all 
our equations with the indicator variable post-FINSA included as an independent variable and remove time 
fixed effects. We find qualitatively similar results, yielding the same inferences. 
Fourth, given the timing of the FINSA legislation, it is possible that the 2007-2008 financial crisis may have 
impacted FINSA-affected firms differently than control firms, and that this impact coincides somewhat with 
the effect of FINSA. As the first two quarters of 2008 are part of the FINSA legislative period, they are excluded 
from our analyses. As a robustness check, we also exclude the second half of 2008, which was when the US 
stock market was in steep decline. Results are qualitatively similar, and inferences are unchanged when this 
period is removed from the sample. 
Fifth, within the non-GAAP literature, there is notable variation in the definition of regulated industries 
subsequently removed from estimation sample. For example, Bentley et al. (2018) remove finance, insurance 
and real estate firms (2-digit SIC codes 60-67), whereas Bhattacharya et al. (2018) exclude financial firms and 
utilities (2-digit SIC codes 49, 60-69). We run all our tests under several different industry restriction choices 
and consistently find results qualitatively similar to those of our main tests.27 
Sixth, in 2004, the FASB issued SFAS 123R, which requires recognition of stock-based compensation 
expense and took effect in 2006. Barth et al. (2012) note that high technology firms were strongly affected by 
SFAS 123R and were “among the most vocal opponents to recognizing stock-based compensation expense” 
(Barth et al., 2012). High tech firms represent a significant portion of treated firms in our sample. Thus, it is 
possible that the increase in recurring expense exclusions and other non-GAAP outcomes we find for treated 
                                                          
26 See McMullin and Schonberger (2018) for a discussion of the use of entropy balancing in earnings management tests.  
27 Specifically, we attempt the following alternative industry restrictions based on 2-digit SIC codes, all of which have been used in the 
non-GAAP literature: (1) 67; (2) 60-67; (3) 49, 60-69; (4) no restriction. 
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firms is driven by high tech firms excluding stock-based compensation, whose requirement for expensing was 
unrelated to FINSA but was contemporaneous with the start of the FINSA regulatory period.28 To rule out 
this explanation for our results, we run our tests after excluding high tech firms. Results are qualitatively similar 
to those of our main tests. 
Finally, we address concerns about firm influence over FINSA legislation. This concern stems from 
critiques of state-antitakeover laws as a source of variation in the takeover market. The prior literature criticizes 
exogeneity claims made by those using state-antitakeover laws because many firms are thought to have 
influenced the antitakeover legislation adopted by the states in which they are incorporated. Gartman (2000) 
reports that 49 state antitakeover laws in 23 different states were subject to firm lobbying that favored passage. 
Despite the small number of lobbying firms vis-à-vis the sample sizes used in the prior literature, Karpoff and 
Wittry (2018) find that retaining these lobbying firms has a material impact on inferences drawn from analyses 
using state antitakeover laws. We compile data from U.S. Senate records on lobbying activities related to FINSA 
and show that, of the 31 companies that lobbied for or against FINSA, 13 were U.S. companies. Of these 13 
companies, 5 were M&A transaction brokers. Consequently, we replicate our analyses by varying the inclusion 
of the 13 domestic firms we have identified as having lobbied for or against FINSA. The lobbying firms were 
Boeing Company, Carlyle Group, Conoco Philips, EDS Corporation, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Goldman 
& Sachs, Halliburton, JP Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, United Technologies Corporations 
and Xcel Energy. Inferences drawn after excluding lobbying firms are nearly identical to those drawn from our 
main specification. 
6.0 Conclusion 
The prior literature debates whether non-GAAP reporting, a form of reporting which permits managers 
significant discretion, is informative or opportunistic. We add to this debate by examining the effect of an 
exogenous source of variation in a managerial disciplining mechanism, the takeover market, on non-GAAP 
reporting quality. We exploit FINSA as a shock to the takeover market based on evidence that FINSA 
significantly decreased the frequency of takeovers for firms deemed critical to national security (Godsell et al., 
                                                          
28 We thank Kurt Gee for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
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2019). We first posit the many pathways by which the takeover market can determine non-GAAP reporting 
outcomes stemming from the role of the takeover market as both a managerial disciplining mechanism and as 
a driver of private information gathering. Using a DiD research design, we find support for the management 
entrenchment hypothesis that predicts managers will engage in more opportunistic non-GAAP reporting when 
the threat of takeover declines. We find that firms affected by FINSA exclude more and larger recurring items 
from non-GAAP performance measures, that these exclusions more often and by larger margins exceed 
contemporaneous exclusions used in analysts’ own estimates of non-GAAP earnings, and that these exclusions 
are more often used to beat analyst benchmarks when GAAP earnings fall short.  
In additional testing, we find that our results accentuate predictably with the likelihood a firm was subject 
to the threat of takeover in the pre-FINSA period, and the extent to which non-GAAP earnings are used as a 
determinant of executive compensation. We find in earnings persistence tests that the persistence of non-
GAAP earnings in critical industries declines after FINSA. We further find that the value relevance of non-
GAAP earnings declines for critical industries, relative to non-critical industries, after FINSA, consistent with 
investor cognizance of FINSA’s weakening of an important managerial disciplining mechanism.  
Overall, our results show that financial protectionism has important financial reporting consequences. We 
draw credible inferences because we are able to benchmark our results against a counterfactual of non-GAAP 
reporting by U.S. firms in non-critical industries, and against the counterfactual of firms in critical industries 
but domiciled in the EU and thereby unaffected by FINSA.  Our findings contribute to the literature examining 
determinants of non-GAAP reporting and to the debate regarding whether non-GAAP performance measures 
are informative or opportunistic. These insights are relevant to non-GAAP scholars, investors, analysts, 
auditors, board directors and regulators interested in the determinants of non-GAAP reporting quality and to 
audiences interested in the unintended consequences of regulating foreign investment. For example, our 
findings should be of interest to legislators in the increasing number of countries that are considering or have 
recently passed FINSA-like legislation where reporting of non-GAAP earnings is proliferating (e.g., Britain, 
France, Germany, China, and India [Steinitz and Ingrassia, 2009; CNN Business, 2018]), and in the U.S., where 
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CFIUS authority has been expanded, under the Foreign Investment Risk Reduction and Management Act of 
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Figure 1. CFIUS notices investigated 




Appendix A. Mitigation Measures 
Mitigation measures negotiated and adopted between 2008 and 2015 required the businesses involved to take 
specific and verifiable actions, including, for example: 
 
 Providing the USG with the right to review certain business decisions and object if they raise national 
security concerns 
 Termination of specific activities of the U.S. business 
 Ensuring that only authorized persons have access to certain technology and information 
 Establishing a Corporate Security Committee and other mechanisms to ensure compliance with all required 
actions, including the appointment of a USG-approved security officer or member of the board of directors 
and requirements for security policies, annual reports and independent audits 
 Ensuring compliance with established guidelines and terms for handling existing or future USG contracts 
and USG customer information 
 Establishing guidelines and terms for handling existing or future USG contracts, USG customer 
information and other sensitive information 
 Ensuring only U.S. persons handle certain products and services and that certain activities and products 
are located only in the U.S. 
 Notifying security officers or relevant USG parties in advance of foreign national visits to the U.S. business 
for approval 
 Notifying relevant USG parties of any material introduction, modification or discontinuation of a product 
or service as well as any awareness of any vulnerability or security incidents 
 Ensuring continued production of certain products for relevant USG parties for specified periods  
 Requiring a proxy entity to perform certain functions and activities of the U.S. business 
 
 
CFIUS agencies use a variety of means to monitor and enforce compliance by the companies that are subject 
to the measures, including: 
 
 Increasing USG staffing levels and assigning staff responsibilities for monitoring compliance 
 Designing tracking systems to monitor required reports 
 Periodic reporting to USG agencies by the companies 
 On-site compliance reviews by USG agencies 
 Third-party audits when provided for by the terms of the mitigation measures 




Appendix B. Qualitative Features of National-Security Firms 
U.S. businesses that: 
1. Provide products and services to an agency or agencies of the USG or state and local authorities that 
have functions that are relevant to national security 
 
2. Provide products or services that could expose national security vulnerabilities, including potential 
cyber security concerns, or create vulnerability to sabotage or espionage (This includes consideration 
of whether the covered transaction will increase the risk of exploitation of the particular U.S. business's 
position in the supply chain.) 
 
3. Have operations, or produce or supply products or services, the security of which may have 
implications for U.S. national security, such as businesses that involve infrastructure that may constitute 
critical infrastructure; businesses that involve various aspects of energy production, including 
extraction, generation, transmission and distribution; businesses that affect the national transportation 
system; and businesses that could significantly and directly affect the U.S. financial system 
 
4. Have access to classified information or sensitive government or government contract information, 
including information about employees 
 
5. Are in the defense, security and national security-related law enforcement sectors 
 
6. Are involved in activities related to weapons and munitions manufacturing, aerospace, satellite and 
radar systems 
 
7. Produce certain types of advanced technologies that may be useful in defending or in seeking to impair 
U.S. national security, which may include businesses engaged in the design and production of 
equipment or components that have both commercial and military applications (Such transactions have 
included, for example, businesses engaged in the design, production or provision of goods and services 
involving network and data security. They have also included businesses that produce semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment, design integrated circuits and fabricate integrated circuits in light of the fact 
that semiconductors are an enabling technology for a range of national security critical devices, systems 
and functions. They have also included businesses that are in the biotechnology sector given the 
potential military applications of such technology and the sensitivity of the information such companies 
may collect.) 
 
8. Engage in the research and development, production or sale of technology, goods, software or services 
that are subject to U.S. export controls 
 
9. Are in a field with significant national security implications in which there are few alternative suppliers 
or in which a loss in U.S. technological competitiveness would be detrimental to national security 
 
10. Have operations or facilities that are in proximity to military or other sensitive USG facilities 
 
11. Hold substantial pools of potentially sensitive data about U.S. persons and businesses that have 
national security importance (Such businesses could be in any number of sectors, including, for 




Appendix C. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition Data Source 
Treatment Industry A firm-level variable equal to one for firms in national 
security-related industries and zero otherwise.  
CFIUS Annual Report 
 
Post-FINSA A variable equal to one in years after 2008 and zero otherwise.  CFIUS Annual Report 
Non-GAAP EPS 
Manager-reported non-GAAP earnings per share. Bentley et al. (2018) Non-
GAAP EPS data. 
GAAP EPS 
Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total common 
shares outstanding. 
CRSP / Compustat 
Size Size is equal to the log of total assets. CRSP / Compustat 
ROA ROA is equal to income before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
CRSP / Compustat 
Market-to-Book Market-to-Book is equal to market value of equity divided by 
book equity. 
CRSP / Compustat 
Big 4 Indicator Big 4 Indicator is equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor, zero otherwise. 
CRSP / Compustat 
Standard Deviation 
of Cash Flows 
Standard deviation of annual cash flows deflated by lagged 
total assets over the past three years.  
CRSP / Compustat 
Investor Sentiment Investor Sentiment is equal to the average level of the monthly 
investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) over 
the earnings announcement quarter. 




Percentage of total firm equity held by institutional investors. Thomson Reuters 
Number of 
Analysts Following 
Number of analyses following the firm. I/B/E/S 
Book Leverage Book Leverage is the log of liabilities scaled by book equity. CRSP / Compustat 
Repeat non-GAAP 
Reporter 
Repeat non-GAAP Reporter is equal to one if the firm 
reported non-GAAP EPS in the previous quarter, zero 
otherwise. 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-
GAAP EPS data. 
Special Charges Special Charges is equal to one if the firm reported non-zero 
income-decreasing special items in the current quarter, zero 
otherwise. 
CRSP / Compustat 
Fourth Quarter 
Indicator 
Fourth Quarter Indicator is equal to one if the observation is 
the fourth fiscal quarter of the year, zero otherwise. 





Manager Total Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to one 
if Manager Total Exclusions is greater than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-




Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to 
one if Manager Recurring Exclusions is greater than zero, zero 
otherwise.  
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-





Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions Indicator is a variable 
equal to one if Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions is greater 
than zero, zero otherwise.  
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-
GAAP EPS data. 
Manager Total 
Exclusions 
Manager Total Exclusions is a variable equal to non-GAAP 
EPS minus GAAP EPS after extraordinary items, scaled by 
assets per share. 
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-





Manager Recurring Exclusions is a variable equal to non-
GAAP EPS minus GAAP EPS from operations, scaled by 
assets per share. 
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-




Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions is a variable equal to 
GAAP EPS from operations minus GAAP EPS after 
extraordinary items, scaled by assets per share. 
CRSP / Compustat and 
Bentley et al. (2018) Non-





Manager Incremental Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal 
to one if Manager Incremental Exclusions is greater than zero, 
zero otherwise. 
I/B/E/S, CRSP / Compustat 
and Bentley et al. (2018) Non-




Manager Incremental Exclusions is a variable equal to non-
GAAP EPS minus I/B/E/S actual EPS, scaled by assets per 
share. 
I/B/E/S, CRSP / Compustat 
and Bentley et al. (2018) Non-
GAAP EPS data. 
StreetBeat 
StreetBeat is a variable equal to one if non-GAAP EPS meets 
or beats the analysts' consensus EPS forecast but GAAP EPS 
from operations misses the analysts' consensus GAAP EPS 
forecast. 
I/B/E/S, CRSP / Compustat 
and Bentley et al. (2018) Non-








Less: Firms with missing test and control variables (2,993) 12,774
Less: Firms without at least one pre and post FINSA observation (5,835) 6,939
Less: Firms in regulated industries (839) 6,100
6,100Estimation Sample Size:
This table reports the construction of the estimation panel. 
Firm-quarter observations with non-GAAP reporting disclosures in our sample period





Fama-French industry code 10 industries) Frequency % Frequency %
Non-Durable 0 0.0% 384 11.9%
Consumer Durable 6 0.2% 133 4.1%
Manufacturing 114 4.0% 832 25.8%
Energy 24 0.8% 353 11.0%
High Tech 1,977 68.7% 484 15.0%
Telecommunication 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Wholesale Retail 0 0.0% 464 14.4%
Health 736 25.6% 115 3.6%
Utilities 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Other (Mines, Construction) 20 0.7% 458 14.2%
Total 2,877 3,223
Year Freq. % Freq. %
2003 Q1 55 1.7% 64 2.2%
2003 Q2 77 2.4% 74 2.6%
2003 Q3 100 3.1% 89 3.1%
2003 Q4 115 3.6% 104 3.6%
2004 Q1 83 2.6% 72 2.5%
2004 Q2 97 3.0% 87 3.0%
2004 Q3 115 3.6% 93 3.2%
2004 Q4 115 3.6% 102 3.5%
2005 Q1 88 2.7% 108 3.8%
2005 Q2 121 3.8% 111 3.9%
2005 Q3 133 4.1% 113 3.9%
2005 Q4 148 4.6% 123 4.3%
2008 Q3 163 5.1% 146 5.1%
2008 Q4 205 6.4% 169 5.9%
2009 Q1 167 5.2% 154 5.4%
2009 Q2 176 5.5% 157 5.5%
2009 Q3 169 5.2% 146 5.1%
2009 Q4 181 5.6% 153 5.3%
2010 Q1 140 4.3% 136 4.7%
2010 Q2 157 4.9% 145 5.0%
2010 Q3 157 4.9% 139 4.8%
2010 Q4 175 5.4% 136 4.7%
2011 Q1 133 4.1% 123 4.3%







Table 2: Sample Breakdown by Industry and Year
This table reports sample characteristics of the control and treated firms. 












Manager Total Exclusions Indicator 0.77 1.00 0.42 3,215        0.87 1.00 0.33 2,878        -10.30
Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator 0.61 1.00 0.49 3,215        0.81 1.00 0.39 2,878        -17.20
Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions Indicator 0.59 1.00 0.49 3,215        0.56 1.00 0.50 2,878        2.70
Manager Total Exclusions 0.01 0.00 0.03 3,215        0.02 0.01 0.04 2,878        -6.00
Manager Recurring Exclusions 0.00 0.00 0.01 3,215        0.01 0.00 0.01 2,878        -14.30
Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions 0.01 0.00 0.03 3,215        0.01 0.00 0.03 2,878        -1.10
Manager Incremental Exclusions Indicator 0.11 0.00 0.32 3,215        0.11 0.00 0.31 2,878        0.40
Manager Incremental Exclusions 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,215        0.00 0.00 0.00 2,878        -2.60
StreetBeat 0.22 0.00 0.41 3,215        0.44 0.00 0.50 2,878        -19.51
Mean Median St. Dev. N Mean Median St. Dev. N
Difference in 
Means t-statistic
Non-GAAP EPS 0.41 0.33 0.45 3,223        0.29 0.23 0.36 2,877        11.30
GAAP EPS 0.20 0.25 0.86 3,223        0.12 0.12 0.62 2,877        4.40
Size 5888.45 1830.70 14696.22 3,223        4427.75 959.28 13859.24 2,877        12.60
ROA 0.08 0.08 0.08 3,223        0.06 0.07 0.10 2,877        11.00
Market-to-Book 2.56 1.85 2.69 3,223        2.88 2.32 2.35 2,877        -5.00
Big 4 Indicator 0.94 1.00 0.24 3,223        0.93 1.00 0.25 2,877        0.90
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows 0.04 0.03 0.03 3,223        0.05 0.03 0.04 2,877        -11.00
Investor Sentiment -0.29 -0.43 0.37 3,223        -0.29 -0.43 0.37 2,877        0.10
Institutional Ownership 0.76 0.81 0.19 3,223        0.76 0.81 0.20 2,877        0.15
Number of Analysts Following 9.88 8.00 6.99 3,223        11.28 9.00 8.01 2,877        -7.30
Book Leverage 0.55 0.56 0.20 3,223        0.40 0.38 0.20 2,877        29.80
Repeat Non-GAAP Reporter 0.57 1.00 0.50 3,223        0.69 1.00 0.46 2,877        -10.20
Special Charges 0.63 1.00 0.48 3,223        0.65 1.00 0.48 2,877        -1.30
Fourth Quarter Indicator 0.29 0.00 0.45 3,223        0.27 0.00 0.45 2,877        1.50
Other Variables
Table 3: Sample Summary Statistics
Sample summary statistics are presented below. All variables are defined in Appendix C.













Treatment Industry 0.0662 0.173* -0.0486
(0.63) (1.89) (-0.47)
Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA 0.215** 0.345*** -0.0645
(2.12) (3.79) (-0.61)
Size -0.103*** -0.0254 0.0436
(-2.85) (-0.80) (1.32)
ROA -1.814*** -1.798*** -0.619**
(-4.85) (-5.43) (-2.11)
Market-to-Book -0.00377 0.00537 -0.0298***
(-0.38) (0.61) (-3.06)
Big 4 Indicator 0.0591 -0.0219 0.0202
(0.55) (-0.22) (0.18)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows -1.911*** -0.857 -0.732
(-2.98) (-1.41) (-1.13)
Investor Sentiment -0.0307 0.160 -0.383**
(-0.17) (1.19) (-2.12)
Institutional Ownership -0.0363 -0.105 0.129
(-0.23) (-0.78) (0.84)
Number of Analysts Following 0.0209*** 0.0180*** -0.00917
(2.89) (3.03) (-1.56)
Book Leverage -0.244 -0.253* 0.349**
(-1.34) (-1.69) (2.28)
Repeat Non-GAAP Reporter 0.177*** 0.187*** -0.105**
(3.61) (4.62) (-2.14)
Special Charges 1.130*** -0.0781* 2.640***
(19.79) (-1.72) (39.98)
Fourth Quarter Indicator -0.302* -0.139 0.280
(-1.69) (-0.96) (1.50)
Number of Observations 6088 6091 6090
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: The effect of a reduction in the threat of takeover on Manager Exclusion Frequency
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup. Treatment Industry is equal to one for firms affected by 
FINSA, and zero otherwise. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero otherwise. Manager 
Total Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to Non-GAAP EPS minus GAAP EPS after extraordinary items. 
Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to Non-GAAP EPS minus GAAP EPS from operations. 
Manager Non-Recurring Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to GAAP EPS from operations minus GAAP EPS 
after extraordinary items.  All other variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Two-
tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance levels at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The model is estimated via a logistic regression.
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Treatment Industry 0.00101 0.000745 0.0000914
(0.56) (0.92) (0.07)
Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA 0.00113 0.00206*** -0.000727
(0.68) (3.17) (-0.57)
Size -0.00321*** -0.00111*** -0.00199***
(-5.65) (-4.41) (-5.07)
ROA -0.0795*** -0.0359*** -0.0316***
(-8.08) (-8.23) (-4.87)
Market-to-Book -0.000128 0.000112 -0.000271
(-0.45) (0.84) (-1.59)
Big 4 Indicator 0.00261 -0.000878 0.00362**
(1.09) (-0.79) (2.17)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows 0.0149 0.0142** -0.000840
(0.82) (2.05) (-0.08)
Investor Sentiment -0.0168*** -0.00329** -0.0143***
(-4.34) (-2.42) (-4.68)
Institutional Ownership -0.00191 -0.00302** 0.000175
(-0.63) (-2.46) (0.09)
Number of Analysts Following 0.000335*** 0.000207*** 0.000111*
(3.76) (5.05) (1.76)
Book Leverage 0.00913** 0.000889 0.00694***
(2.50) (0.55) (3.10)
Repeat Non-GAAP Reporter -0.00289*** 0.000560* -0.00318***
(-3.00) (1.65) (-4.26)
Special Charges 0.0126*** 0.000355 0.0124***
(15.53) (1.01) (19.55)
Fourth Quarter Indicator 0.0176*** 0.00477*** 0.0128***
(5.17) (3.84) (4.79)
Number of Observations 6093 6093 6093
Adjusted R-Squared 0.184 0.179 0.158
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: The effect of a reduction in the threat of takeover on Manager Exclusion Magnitudes
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup. Treatment Industry is equal to one for firms 
affected by FINSA, and zero otherwise. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero 
otherwise. Manager Total Exclusions is a variable equal to Non-GAAP EPS minus GAAP EPS after 
extraordinary items, scaled by assets per share. Manager Recurring Exclusions is a variable equal to Non-
GAAP EPS minus GAAP EPS from operations, scaled by assets per share. Manager Non-Recurring 
Exclusions is a variable equal to GAAP EPS from operations minus GAAP EPS after extraordinary items, 
scaled by assets per share.   All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed 



















Big 4 Indicator -0.0548
(-0.36)














Fourth Quarter Indicator 0.236
(1.12)
Number of Observations 5909
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes
Table 6: The effect of a reduction in the threat of takeover on 
the frequency of Management Exclusions that exceed Analyst 
Exclusions
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup. Treatment 
Industry is equal to one for firms affected by FINSA, and zero 
otherwise. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 
and zero otherwise. Manager Incremental Exclusions Indicator is a 
variable equal to one if Manager Incremental Exclusions is greater than 
zero, zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed 
significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  All other variables 



















Big 4 Indicator -0.000254
(-0.47)














Fourth Quarter Indicator 0.000582
(1.37)
Number of Observations 6093
Adjusted R-Squared 0.054
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes
Table 7: The effect of a reduction in the threat of takeover on the 
magnitude of Management Exclusions that exceed Analyst 
Exclusions
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup. Treatment 
Industry is equal to one for firms affected by FINSA, and zero otherwise. 
Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero 
otherwise. Manager Incremental Exclusions is a variable equal to Non-
GAAP EPS minus I/B/E/S actual EPS, scaled by assets per share.  All 
other variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient 

















Big 4 Indicator -0.0232
(-0.19)














Fourth Quarter Indicator -0.0688
(-0.43)
Number of Observations 6050
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes
Table 8: The effect of a reduction in the threat of takeover on the 
use of Non-GAAP to shift an analyst consensus miss to a beat
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup. Treatment 
Industry is equal to one for firms affected by FINSA, and zero 
otherwise. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 
and zero otherwise. StreetBeat is a variable equal to one if Non-GAAP 
EPS meets or beats the analysts' consensus EPS forecast but GAAP EPS 
from operations misses the analysts' consensus GAAP EPS forecast.  All 
other variables are defined in Appendix C.  Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance levels at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. The model is estimated via a logistic regression.
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Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA 0.212 0.474*** 0.00174* 0.00237*** 0.141 0.396* 0.000626 0.000742 0.456*** 0.530***
(1.64) (3.62) (1.69) (2.91) (0.83) (1.90) (1.13) (1.47) (3.59) (3.75)
Number of Observations 3041 3046 3047 3046 2948 2908 3047 3046 2988 2954
Adjusted R-Squared 0.163 0.187 0.058 0.041
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low Sensitivity High Sensitivity Low Sensitivity High Sensitivity Low Sensitivity High Sensitivity Low Sensitivity High Sensitivity Low Sensitivity High Sensitivity
Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA 0.339** 0.346*** -0.0000507 0.00253*** 0.150 0.367** -0.000251 0.00120** 0.426** 0.434***
(2.05) (2.93) (-0.05) (2.85) (0.77) (2.08) (-0.66) (2.32) (2.45) (3.54)
Number of Observations 1967 3560 1967 3560 1849 3560 1967 3560 1967 3560
Adjusted R-Squared 0.174 0.173 0.083 0.055
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Control Variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Cross-sectional Analyses
This table examines a non-GAAP variable in a DiD setup after partitioning the sample by a cross-sectional variable. The first cross-sectional variable is the pre-FINSA likelihood of takeover. The second cross-sectional variable is the sensitivity of 
manager compensation to non-GAAP earnings. Treatment Industry is equal to one for firms affected by FINSA, and zero otherwise. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10 estimate logistic regressions.  
Panel A: Takeover Probability Cross-Sectional Analysis
Manager Incremental Exclusions StreetBeat
Manager Recurring Exclusions 
Indicator
Manager Recurring Exclusions
Manager Incremental Exclusions 
Indicator
Manager Incremental Exclusions
Panel B: Sensitivity of Compensation to Non-GAAP Earnings Cross-Sectional Analysis
Manager Recurring Exclusions 
Indicator
Manager Recurring Exclusions










Non-GAAP Earnings 2.355*** 2.978***
(12.27) (13.61)
Non-GAAP Earnings × Post-FINSA 0.361* -0.556**
(1.71) (-2.02)
Managerial Exclusions -0.163*** -0.174**
(-3.25) (-2.53)






Big 4 Indicator 0.00327 0.0156
(0.45) (1.42)
Standard Deviation of Cash Flows 0.0544 -0.0522
(0.72) (-0.74)
Investor Sentiment -0.0178** -0.0390***
(-2.58) (-3.58)
Institutional Ownership 0.0284*** 0.0498***
(3.03) (3.30)
Number of Analysts Following 0.000220 0.000100
(0.63) (0.26)
Book Leverage -0.00287 -0.0289**
(-0.24) (-2.01)
Repeat Non-GAAP Reporter -0.00470** -0.00289
(-2.51) (-0.89)
Special Charges -0.0000435 -0.00173
(-0.02) (-0.43)
Fourth Quarter Indicator 0.00279 -0.00813
(0.40) (-0.65)
Number of Observations 3170 2808
Adjusted R-Squared 0.566 0.555
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects: Yes Yes
Future Earnings
Table 10: Persistence Tests
This table examines the persistence of Non-GAAP earnings after FINSA for treatment and 
control industry firms.  Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-









Earnings × Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA -12.39*** -1.168
(-3.38) (-0.67)






Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA -1.736 -4.305***
(-1.40) (-4.09)
Earnings × Treatment Industry 14.73*** 2.548***
(4.33) (2.65)
Earnings × Post-FINSA 7.096*** 1.158
(3.73) (1.38)




Loss × Earnings -18.80*** -21.24***
(-5.94) (-12.70)
Number of Observations 6076 6076
Adjusted R-Squared 0.605 0.549
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm
Table 11: Value Relevance Tests
This table examines the value-relevance of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings after FINSA. Price is 
equal to the average price around the earnings announcement date (–5, +5). Earnings is equal to 
either Non-GAAP or GAAP earnings as indicated by the column header. Equity book value is 
common shareholder's equity divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Loss is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the income before extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-








Placebo Treatment Industry 0.501** 2.397*** 0.136
(2.31) (6.27) (0.52)
Post-FINSA -1.423*** -0.724* -1.311*
(-6.10) (-1.90) (-1.95)
Placebo Treatment Industry × Post-FINSA -0.282 -0.556 -0.590
(-0.64) (-0.76) (-0.50)
Number of Observations 1362 508 275
Standard Errors Clustered By: Firm Firm Firm
Industry Fixed Effects: No Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects: No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects: No Yes Yes
Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator
Table 12: Placebo Test using European Union (EU) Firms
This table examines the frequency of manager recurring exclusions in a placebo group of FINSA industries in 
the EU which should be unaffected by FINSA. Placebo Treatment Industry is equal to one for firms in 
industries affected by FINSA, but domiciled in the EU, and zero for firms in industries unaffected by FINSA 
and domiciled in the EU. Post-FINSA is equal to one in year-quarters after Q2 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Manager Recurring Exclusions Indicator is a variable equal to one if the firm excludes recurring items in Non-
GAAP earnings. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Two-tailed t-statistics are presented underneath the 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  The 
model is estimated via a logistic regression.
